OJIT: A Novel Obfuscation Approach Using Standard Just-In-Time Compiler Transformations by Hataba, Muhammad et al.
OJIT: A Novel Obfuscation Approach Using Standard
Just-In-Time Compiler Transformations
Muhammad Hataba, Ahmed El-Mahdy, Erven Rohou
To cite this version:
Muhammad Hataba, Ahmed El-Mahdy, Erven Rohou. OJIT: A Novel Obfuscation Approach
Using Standard Just-In-Time Compiler Transformations. International Workshop on Dynamic
Compilation Everywhere, Jan 2015, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 2015. <hal-01162998>
HAL Id: hal-01162998
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01162998
Submitted on 12 Jun 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
OJIT: A Novel Obfuscation Approach Using Standard Just-In-Time
Compiler Transformations
Muhammad Hataba, E-JUST
Ahmed El-Mahdy, E-JUST
Erven Rohou, INRIA
With the adoption of cloud computing, securing remote program execution becomes an important issue. Re-
lying on standard data encryption is not enough, since code execution happens on remote servers, possibly
allowing for eavesdropping from potential adversaries; thus the full execution process requires protection
from such threats. In this paper, we introduce OJIT system as a novel approach for obfuscating programs,
making it difficult for adversaries to reverse-engineer. The system exploits the JIT compilation technology to
dynamically transform the code, making it constantly changing, thereby complicating the execution state.
This paper quantitatively studies the effect of this approach by considering a set of obfuscation metrics
borrowed from the software engineering field. The paper constructs a testbed system using the LLVM com-
pilation framework that frequently applies random sequences of standard compiler optimizations on the
currently running program. Results on using selected benchmarks from the SPEC CPU 2006 suite show a
significant sustainable increase in obfuscation for a large number of standard optimizations over the run-
time course of the programs.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of cloud computing, securing the execution of programs onto re-
mote computers becomes an important issue [Zissis and Lekkas 2012]; an adversary
can potentially inspect the execution state of the underlying virtual machine either
directly (from the service provider side) or indirectly; via ‘side channels’ attacks (from
the users side) [Ristenpart et al. 2009; Somorovsky et al. 2011].
There are many types of side-channel attacks: Trace-driven attacks aim to recon-
struct the entire execution-trace of the program [Acıic¸mez and Koc¸ 2006; Kocher et al.
1999]; Access-driven attacks that analyze the correlation between processing and ac-
cess patterns of physical resources such as the cache or memory [Neve and Seifert
2007; Gullasch et al. 2011]; timing-based attacks where an attacker monitors the exe-
cution time of a running program and utilize this to infer knowledge about operational
dependences in the program [Brumley and Hakala 2009; Brumley and Tuveri 2011;
Bonneau and Mironov 2006]; and more recently, acoustic attacks, which exploit the
sounds emitted by computer internals such as the processor to recognize machine op-
erations in an elaborate crypto analysis scheme to recover encryption keys [Genkin
et al. 2013].
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[Ristenpart et al. 2009] have provided an interesting case study of such threats.
They showed that a malicious insider in the cloud platform could harness the pow-
ers of the physical machine which he/she is co-resident in to launch side channel at-
tacks. The attacker could model the cloud virtual machines (VMs) spatial information
effectively, thereby exploiting placement vulnerabilities in cloud computing services
providers. Thus adversaries can use this knowledge to plant their malicious VM with
a victim instance, and then launch cross-VM side-channel attacks. [Ristenpart et al.
2009] launched their attacks against Amazon’s EC2 cloud with success ratio of 40% in
co-residence with a target VM.
These threats show that open system security principles – that is standard data
encryption – is not enough; since the decryption software runs not the same plat-
form, it permits eavesdropping from potential adversaries, with the aim of program
reverse-engineering or even tampering. Thus “security by obscurity” is a promising
paradigm, in which the designers hide system vulnerabilities in the system implemen-
tation. Hence comes the definition of code obfuscation as being the practice of hiding
the purpose, meaning and operation of the code from adversaries, making it difficult to
reverse engineer [Mataes and Montford 2005]. This concept is widely popular between
virus and malware designers to hide their signatures from virus scanners to avoid de-
tection and allow them to surreptitiously implant and execute their code on remote vic-
tims [You and Yim 2010]. Many real-world systems apply elements of these approaches
to meet the aforementioned security requirements. This is related to what is called the
fortification principle where “the defender covering all attack vectors” [Pavlovic 2011]
via logical complexity [Aumann and Heifetz 2002].
In this paper we consider code obfuscation approach for securing such execution en-
vironment. Obfuscation allows for hiding the code semantics from adversaries; a plau-
sible scenario is a company who wishes to adopt cloud computing so as to benefit from
economics of scale, while making it difficult for adversaries to reverse engineer their
programs. Here, we build on an earlier work [Hataba et al. 2013] to exploit the utility
of just-in-time (JIT) compilers to dynamically and continuously change the execution
image at rapid frequencies, thereby complicating the understanding of programs to
the adversary. That is even if the attacker managed to launch a side-channel attack;
they would have to collect all versions of the running program and try to find relations
between these pieces, which we will conceal and try to make it as random as possible;
thus rendering all analysis efforts useless. In particular, this paper has the following
contributions:
— Extend an earlier LLVM implementation to allow for an automated testbed for full
benchmarks (instead of selected kernels).
— Analyse the obfuscation strength of such approach on standard benchmarks from the
SPEC CPU 2006 suite.
— Discuss the utility of such approach within the cloud computing environment.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some related work. Section 3
provides a background on LLVM compilation framework which we extend for obfusca-
tion. Section 4 discusses the implementation of our system and the various obfusca-
tion techniques we used. Section 5 introduces experiments and analysis of the system
strength against different obfuscation evaluation metrics. . Finally, Section 6 concludes
the paper and illuminates future work.
2. RELATED WORK
There have been many attempts in the literature to solve the security problem in
the remote execution paradigm; however, none of them has considered using dynamic
compilation technology.
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Twin Clouds: [Bugiel et al. 2011] propose securing the cloud by utilizing two clouds
as: a trusted private cloud (where the cloud is under user’s control) and a commodity
public cloud. The private cloud is used for encrypting critical data and algorithms
(setup phase), and the commodity cloud is used for computing time critical computa-
tions (trusted cloud queries) in parallel under encryption (the query phase); a user
first sends his/her request to the trusted private cloud which authenticates and en-
crypts the algorithm/data using a trust mechanism that is based on Yao’s garbled cir-
cuits [Yao 1986]. Garbled circuits allow for computing a function between two parties
without revealing a party’s input to the other party. Garbled circuits symmetrically
“encrypt” functions and securely evaluate it on “encrypted” data — we have a func-
tion represented by a garbled circuit and a garble table to map each garbled input to
a corresponding garbled output. Then this can be applied on the encrypted data as
well and, further more, can be verified. Each input ‘0’ or ‘1’ is assigned to a random
(garbled) value. Then a table is constructed such that for each garbled input, a garbled
output is calculated using a pseudo random function (garbled circuit). This process is
based on two party encryption to realize what is called verifiable computing [Gennaro
et al. 2010]. That is computing the value of a function with minimal knowledge from
participating parties. The system exposes the twin cloud architecture to programmers,
increasing the cost of software. Moreover, it incurs the extra cost of garbled circuit ex-
ecution and communication between the clouds. But still this work presented a prac-
tically efficient approach for secure computations as opposed to Full Homomorphic
Encryption (FHE) which aims to allow computations on encrypted data without using
additional helper information [Gentry and Halevi 2011; Smart and Vercauteren 2010].
Hypervisor Security: [McCune et al. 2010] discussed the issue of how to trust a
hypervisor. They present root trust static and dynamic management concepts. They
suggest having a third party certificate authority that provides certificates that can
be used for remote attestation of a given platform; by extending the Trusted Comput-
ing Base (TCB) as per the Orange Book [Latham 1986]. The difference between Static
Root Trust Management (SRTM) and Dynamic Root Trust Management (DRTM) is
that the latter can start a program in an Isolated Execution Environment (IEE) at
any time not just at boot time, which is a new root for trust chained from the ini-
tial state of the machine (a clean CPU state). Hence, a client can be assured that its
virtual machine is integral since it has started from a trustworthy state, and have not
been modified or replaced by a malicious one.The system incurs a costly start overhead
due to the chained trust mechanism. Moreover, the system is still susceptible to side-
channels attacks from other virtual machines. Also a downside of the system is that
the technique relies only on verifying that the hash belong to a list of trusted hashes,
but that does not necessarily guarantee that it represents a trustworthy module. The
certificate authority can be deceived by a fraudulent certificate issued by a malicious
insider since the system relies only on a key for security in the launch process. More-
over, after the launch process, there is no way to guarantee neither the integrity nor
the privacy of our computations on the cloud during runtime. There is also the risk of
sabotage attacks via buffer and memory overflow exploits.
Secure Virtual Architecture (SVA): [Criswell et al. 2007] present a new compiler-
based virtual instruction set for executing code on a given system including kernel and
application code. The architecture provides instructions for object-level memory safety,
control-flow integrity and type safety, allowing it to monitor all privileged operations
and control physical resources. They also provide custom instructions to control mem-
ory layout such as allocation and explicit de-allocation instructions. Thus this work
only protects the system from sabotage attacks on physical resource such as memory
or buffer overflow attack. However, the system is still susceptible to eavesdropping at-
tack, especially at the OS level. Moreover, SVA sandboxing mechanism focuses only
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Fig. 1: LLVM System Architecture Diagram. 1
on the instruction set beyond the Intermediate Representation (IR) level and a code-
generation phase, which means – in our opinion – the system do not fully utilize the
dynamic nature of LLVM’s JIT compiler, which we consider in our system.
It is worth noting that obfuscation has been around for some time. It was introduced
to manage the privacy of sensitive data in cloud computing platforms [Sharif et al.
2008] and for program protection as in [Hataba and El-Mahdy 2012]. But the more
prevalent use of obfuscation is in hiding malware and other foist software in order
to evade scanning or analysis. An example work of such context is of [Sharif et al.
2008].They proposed a technique for obfuscating trigger-based malware code, based
on some conditions at the static compiler level. This scheme allows for evading mal-
ware analysis tools. They used LLVM compiler to transform the input program into
an obfuscated binary. The system captures a conditional input trigger that starts the
malware; it derives an encryption key from the input, encrypts the code, and then re-
moves the key from the generated code. Thus analyzer programs cannot easily detect
the start or execution of malware code. This system generates static obfuscated code
essentially for malware triggering. However, our proposed system generates dynami-
cally and every changing obfuscated code; which is generic in that sense.
3. OJIT IMPLEMENTATION
3.1. The JIT Compiler
A compiler is a special program that translates a program written in high-level lan-
guage to machine-level instructions. The idea behind dynamic compilation is that a
program is only translated to machine code at runtime as opposed to static compilers,
which does the translation offline i.e before program execution begins. As for dynamic
compilers we have two types: Ahead-Of-Time and Just-In-Time compilers. First type
is Ahead-of-Time (AOT) compilation, in which compilation happens on the whole once
during the start-up time, generating machine dependent binary. Another type is Just-
In-Time (JIT) compilation [Aycock 2003] where program units (such as functions or
basic blocks), are compiled on-demand, at the execution time. The generated code is
machine dependent. Our OJIT system is based on JIT technology as it allows for con-
tinual recompilations, generating different binaries at runtime.
Program execution calls back (called trampoline code) into the JIT runtime system,
that gives the JIT the advantage of adaptively optimizing programs taking into con-
sideration the current execution characteristics such as cache hit ratio and instruction
execution rate. That potentially allows for better optimizations than static compilers.
Compilers have access to a vast amount of program semantic information. That, in
addition to the dynamic nature of JIT compilers, has the potential for providing rich
1Original Figure from www.llvm.org, courtesy of Chris Lattner and Vikram Adve.
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security objectives. We exploit the recompilation to constantly provide different pro-
grams, as will be described in the next section.
A quite powerful infrastructure for building compilers is the open source frame-
work [The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure ]. Historically, LLVM began as a research
project known as (Low Level Virtual Machine) developed by Vikram Adve and Chris
Lattner at the University of Illinois at Urbana, Champaign [The LLVM Compiler In-
frastructure ; Lattner 2002] with the goal of providing a static/dynamic compiler appli-
cable for an arbitrary wide range of programming languages. Now LLVM is the official
compiler for Apple products including MAC OS X and iOS. The compiler is based on
the famous Static Single Assignment (SSA) form, where a variable is assigned only
once; SSA [Lattner 2002] significantly simplifies developing compiler optimizations.
3.2. System Design
Our goal is to design a system that produces functionally equivalent versions of the
same program and have them running on the cloud in a randomly orchestrated yet
ever-changing manner. That would make reverse engineering very complicated if not
improbable. Hence, it will render side-channel attacks anything but useful.
Obfuscation can potentially be integrated into the original architecture of the LLVM
compiler shown in Figure 1 along with its optimization stages as follows.
—Front-End Obfuscation
An Input program in any LLVM supported high level programming language such as
C, C++, Objective C and Java can be subjected to various obfuscations on the layout
level. These preprocessor transformations [Wroblewski 2002; Collberg et al. 1997]
range from removing class information, scrambling identifiers, to inserting dummy
code to confuse an attacker. Then the program is translated to bytecode (LLVM’s
Intermediate Representation (IR) code).
—Back-End Obfuscation
These could be during install time of the code to binary instruction corresponding to
the target CPU architecture (currently supported platforms vary from typical x86,
x64 architectures to smartphones’ ARM processors and also Cell processors.). Possi-
ble obfuscations include changing address spaces, register reassignment or machine-
level instruction set substitution.
— IR LLVM Obfuscation
This is our primary focus here; since we have the advantage of being largely ma-
chine and language independent. There are many obfuscation transformations that
can be done to the IR code (see Appendix A which indexes a set of LLVM optimization
passes that we used in our system and refer to [The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure
] for more information on their operation and functionality). Some of these transfor-
mations can be used for the purpose of data flow obfuscation since change the data
structure appearing in the source code: aggregating, eliminating or combining vari-
ables, propagating constants, sinking and re-association. Other transformation can
be used to disrupt attacker by concealing control flow via obfuscation. Example tech-
niques include: aggregation techniques such as: opaque predicates, loop unrolling,
clone methods, inline/outline methods and changing the control flow graph (CFG). We
selected a number of transformations that can be applied to mutate IR code dynami-
cally. These transformations disrupt the otherwise normal behavior and control-flow
of the program while retaining the same functionality. These transformations are
randomly yet surreptitiously applied to the code during the JIT compilation on Func-
tion and Module Pass bases.
We modified the Execution Engine of LLVM forcing it to lazily call the JIT compiler ev-
ery time a function is invoked. We combined this sort of trampoline calls with our own
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obfuscation transformations, such that every time we JIT a function, we effectively
obfuscate it.
There are many ways in which an attacker can analytically de-obfuscate our pro-
gram in order to reverse engineer it [Kirk and Jenkins 2004]. Therefore, these tech-
niques have to be taken into our design consideration as follows.
— Pattern Matching: Analyzers may compare and match obfuscated code to other well-
known obfuscation techniques to find common similarities. So obfuscation has to be
innovative and not at all generic, i.e. more syntactically related to the real program
and randomly yet dynamically changing in that sense.
— Program Slicing: If we have used various methods of data and control aggregation
and restructuring tools, a program may seem difficult to analyze by a human. But
for a slicer program, it can carefully calculate variable values at every point of the
program and which statements contributed to that value. In order to impede these
tools, we can use inherent dependences between variables and add more bogus de-
pendences thereby increasing slice sizes and making it more difficult for the analyzer
to understand them. Also adding aliases for variable names or duplicate variables
specially global and inter-procedural one; this will greatly slow down the slicer and
slice sizes would grow exponentially.
— Statistical Analysis: De-obfuscators use statistical probability analysis to guess the
outcome of predicates and evaluate conditional branches. So, predicates should be
carefully selected not to be always true or always false. Several predicates can be
chosen to have to be evaluated at the same time, for example, having side effects for
opaque predicates.
— Data-flow Analysis: Usually de-obfuscation tools employ techniques that tend to
eliminate obfuscations we introduced before. So we have to carefully choose what
and where bogus code we inserted.
— Theorem Proving: For example, an analyzer can use a theorem proving mechanism to
prove that some loop always terminates at a certain value. So we have to complicate
that by employing more difficult to prove mathematical expressions.
— Partial Evaluation: Some tools can evaluate the static part of the program before
runtime – sometimes pre-processing – and eliminate it. Introducing more inter-
procedural dependences can impede this.
3.3. System Operation
The following are the normal steps upon which our system operates.
(1) Front-end compiler converts an input program into a LLVM intermediate repre-
sentation object files (bytecode).
(2) Extract Symbols: dynamically link multi-phase communication between LLVM li-
braries and working module. Then create a stub for every symbol encountered. We
here focus on function calls and create different stubs for each. These stubs will be
evaluated later lazily.
(3) Identify machine code target for platform dependent optimizations and load the
JIT execution engine.
(4) Lazily call the compiler: only when the execution requires that some function need
to be computed, the stub is called and evaluated and also obfuscated. This makes
sure that system does not fall into a circle of trampoline calls between the JIT and
the executing program.
(5) Random number generation: choose an arbitrary random number that will be used
to select the number of transformations suites to be applied and also which set of
transformations will be selected. A strong random number generator forces unex-
pected code version. We can apply a series of K arbitrary transformation passes,
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each of which can be chosen from the set of N obfuscation transformations (selected
from the quite large available pool of LLVM optimisation passes);noticing that the
order of applying these transformation is significant; therefore, we can generate
O(Nk) different transformation sequences. Thus, the probability of applying the
same number and type of transformations in the same order is very rare to hap-
pen. An attacker would find great difficulty in enumerating all these possibilities,
since theoretically K could be infinite.
(6) Select randomized transformations: we have a huge pool of selected transforma-
tions. Transformations order itself is random to add more obscurity.
(7) Symbol Resolution load required symbols “variable and objects” for the program
and execute the program using the JIT emitter (backend compiler) which produces
the machine code.
(8) Check for recursions: our scheme insures oblivious transformations even for recur-
sive function call. Here we treat a recursive call as a new symbol and we create a
new stub for it.
(9) Code morphing: this is a key feature in OJIT for producing multi-versions of the
same code with the same functionality of course and remove old ones. As we said
before we create a new stub for every symbol and even for recursive calls. After we
use the code we remove its reference from the memory so that the memory space
can be reused.
In order to make sure of the integrity of our obfuscation system and the correctness
of the resulting code, we treat every function call as a new one and we obfuscate the
source IR. After executing the obfuscated function, its pointer will be erased from the
libLTO, the library class file that keeps track of all code-generated function. Thereby
we force the compiler to treat it as a new function if it is called again anywhere in
the program for example in a recursive call a situation typically happening in most
programs due to what is called the principle of locality [Denning 2005]. The principle
of locality states that the program stays 80% percent of the time executing 20% of the
code.
As we said before the obfuscation unit for OJIT is a function call, it is also worth
noting that there is a technique to extract loops as recursive function calls, which can
be obfuscated afterwards dynamically using OJIT. Also we can extract a group of basic
blocks into a new function call. Thereby we made the entire program as a series of
function calls, which can cost a lot of branching overheads, memory exhaustion and
then great performance degradation. Hence, for the sake of a simplicity and as a proof
of concept we omitted these steps from the experimental evaluation.
4. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Choosing Candidate Metrics for System Evaluation
To evaluate the strength of obfuscation, we seek an objective evaluation method. Gen-
erally, assessing obfuscation is not trivial; there are four major criteria for such evalu-
ation, namely: potency, resilience, software complexity and cost. However, the software
complexity criteria is more suitable to provide for an objective measure. A suggested
measure is to check for textual code dfferences [Collberg and Nagra 2009] which in-
dadvertedly would translate to control-flow changes and data-flow dependencies there-
after. Much like the famous software plagiarism detection system [Moss (Measure Of
Software Similarity) ], we choose a sort of fingerprinting for ‘similarity’ [Schleimer
et al. 2003] metric to measure the variations among the generated program versions.
A well-known similarity metric is the longest common subsequence (LCS) [Chvatal
and Sankoff 1975], widely used in the field of bioinformatics.
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Fig. 2: LCSs for Compress Function in the
bzip2 Program.
Fig. 3: Execution Times from Running
the bzip2 Program 10 Times.
We also consider other software complexity metrics [Kirk and Jenkins 2004; Anck-
aert et al. 2007; Hataba and El-Mahdy 2012] which are: Instruction count (IC), branch
count (BC) and the cyclomatic number, which is the number of merge points -as an
indication of decision taken- (Phi). All of these metrics mainly assess the control-flow
complexity. Also, we utilized execution time as an indication of cost, as well as obfus-
cation complexity.
4.2. The Experiments
We conduct our experiments on a MacBook Pro laptop, equipped with the Intel’s Core
i5 microprocessor, and 4GB RAM. The system runs Mac OS X Mavericks. We selected
frequently executed functions from 401.bzip2, 470.lbm, and 473.astar programs (from
the [Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation ] SPEC CPU 2006 Benchmark
Suite).
Figure 2 shows the LCS values for running the “compress” function of 401.bzip2
benchmark ten times. The achieved similarities varies from as low as 2% to as high as
80%. The choice of the set of transformations to apply is the main reason behind this
variation. Figure 3 shows the variation in execution time; the results show around
30% variation with a cost reach up to a maximum of 15% as opposed to the original
unmodified code version’s execution time (shown in the first entry of the figure)
Since transformations significantly affects our obfuscation metrics, we consider the
effect of each possible transformation in the LLVM system on a set of functions; the list
of transformation is listed in Appendix-A. Since the effect depends also on the underly-
ing program/function, we consider various functions. In the following, we ran the test
program several times iteratively having it obfuscated using each transformation from
the entire obfuscation pool of LLVM passes. Typically these benchmarks have a large
number of function that are continuously obfuscated by our system. Therefore, as a
proof of concept we focused on an arbitrary selected functions from these benchmarks
and we collected our metrics from these specific observations.
For the 470.lbm program,as a show case, we focused arbitrarily on the two main
functions: the entry “main” function, referred to in the figures as F1, and “MAIN parse
CommandLine”, referred to in the figures as F2. The results obtained are shown in
Figures 4 through 7. Figure 4 shows the similarity (LCS) between a code version as a
subject to an obfuscation transformation and the original code unchanged code version;
similarities varies from 10% to 100%.
Figures 5 and 6 plot the results from the complexity metric IC, BC, and Phi counts;
the variation is small for Phi counts, and significant for IC and BC with up to 40%
variations, for both F1 and F2 functions.
The functions do not have loops, therefore they are not affected by loop transforma-
tion passes (27–30) ( refer to Appendix A to learn the functionality of these transforma-
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Fig. 4: LCS for the Main Two Functions
in the lbm Program.
Fig. 5: IC,BC and Phi for the F1 Function
in the lbm Program.
Fig. 6: IC, BC and Phi for the F2 Function
in the lbm Program.
Fig. 7: Execution Times for the lbm Pro-
gram.
Fig. 8: LCS for the Main Function in the
astar Program.
Fig. 9: IC, BC And Phi for the Main Func-
tion in the astar Program.
tions), see Figure 4. Also, for inter-procedural variable simplification transformations
(2,4 and 5, - again see Appendix A- that eliminate some dead arguments or propagate
constants), they have little effects on each function. That is mainly due to code sim-
plicity, that does not involve much parameter passing. But other than such cases each
program or even a function in it, will somehow respond to the aforementioned trans-
formations. On the other hand, there are transformations that greatly affected each of
the functions, especially the control-flow transformation passes such as: 5, 20, 21 and
22 ( refer to Appendix A).These proved to be very useful and should be leveraged in an
obfuscation-oriented set up.
Figure 7 shows total execution time for the 470.lbm benchmark after applying each
transformation pass. Results show upto 40% variation. This gives a sense of cost to the
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usage of each transformation pass. And comparing to the original program’s execution
time (shown in the first entry of the figure), the cost didn’t exceed 20% . Nonetheless,
such variation is a feature luckily helpful in impeding timing-based channel.
It is also worth noting that in the case of original OJIT such case would be im-
probable to happen. That is because each time we dynamically choose a random array
of transformation passes to apply to the code at once and produce a corresponding
code version. Such combinations of transformation passes would affect that, and thus
provide resilience to various sorts of side-channel attacks and reverse engineering at-
tempts.
Affirming the previous deductions, we put the 473.astar program into test with the
same setup. This program has numerous functions, so we also arbitrarily focused on
the entry “main” function. Figures 8 and 9 shows that the function have have rather
complex control-flow, responding well to control-flow transformations.
It’s worth mentioning that these obfuscation metrics -simple as they may seem- as
well as others suggested in the literature [Hataba and El-Mahdy 2012; Collberg and
Nagra 2009]are the subject of ongoing research to thoroughly assert our proposed sys-
tem. In addition to that, a complete cost and performance measure of our system is
being investigated. But for the time being the illustrated results are just preliminary
observations to show the validity of our system. Also,undeniably the resilience of our
system in real attack scenarios against automated analysis tools is an important eval-
uation criteria that we will investigate in our future work.
In summary, from the results it is shown that these transformations change the
appearance of the code and hence its control-flow and data-flow dependences which
translate to logical complexity and unintelligibility hindering attacker’s reverse engi-
neering goals via trace side-channels or decompilation tools. Also, we have to mention
that execution time in our scenario incurs the initial overhead of JIT compilation as
opposed to static compilation. Moreover, this overhead is combined with obfuscation
transformations costs. Yet, these performance penalties, though might seem as a dis-
advantage, but in the context of timing side-channel attack scenarios these could be
seen as a defence disrupting statistical analysis efforts. We foresee that the more dy-
namic and random are these changes being applied, the more secure our system should
be.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper we explore the utility of JIT compilation to obfuscate programs. We have
extend the LLVM compilation framework to allow for generating random sequences of
compilation transformations. Using a set of obfuscation metrics and benchmark func-
tions, the results of applying the method indicated significant increase in program ob-
fuscation, reaching down to 2% code similarity, with a typical variation spanning 40%
for our considered complexity metrics. The technique also has the advantage of being
platform independent, and can readily be applied to remote execution environments,
such as cloud computing.
OJIT is still in an early stage of development, and we plan to extend it along sev-
eral dimensions. Future work include studying the effect of random transformation
sequences in the front and back-end parts of LLVM. Moreover, explicit obfuscation
methods can significantly further complicate programs, when combined with standard
transformations, optimizations; this requires further investigations. Finally, an inter-
esting aspect is modelling obfuscation cost (in terms of execution time) and strength
trade-off, thereby allowing for controlling obfuscation depending on the required level
of security.
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Appendix A
The LLVM uses the list of transformation as shown in the following table. We label
each transformation with a number, that is referenced earlier in the paper.
Transformation
No.
Optimization Pass Name
1 Reassociate Pass
2 GVN Pass
3 CFG Simplification Pass
4 Constant Propagation Pass
5 Instruction Combining Pass
6 Dead Instruction Elimination Pass
7 Dead Code Elimination Pass
8 Aggressive Dead Code Elimination Pass
9 Demote Register To Memory Pass
10 Promote Memory To Register Pass
11 Memory Copy Optimization Pass
12 Dead Store Elimination Pass
13 Indirect Variable Simplify Pass
14 LICM Pass
15 Sinking Pass
16 Instruction Namer Pass
17 AAEval Pass
18 De-linearization Pass
19 Partially Inline Lib. Calls Pass
20 Unreachable Block Elimination Pass
21 Early CSE Pass
22 Lower Expect Intrinsic Pass
23 Instruction Simplifier Pass
24 Jump Threading Pass
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25 Scalar Replicate Aggregates Pass
26 Tail Call Elimination Pass
27 Loop Rotate Pass
28 Loop Unswitch Pass
29 Loop Deletion Pass
30 Loop Unroll Pass
31 SCCP Pass
32 GC Lowering Pass
33 Dwarf EH Pass
34 Stack Protector Pass
35 Flatten CFG Pass
36 Break Critical Edges Pass
37 Default PBQP Register Allocator Pass
38 Basic Register Allocator Pass
39 Greedy Register Allocator Pass
40 Fast Register Allocator Pass
41 Lower Switch Pass
42 Lower Invoke Pass
43 Function Inlining Pass
44 Sample Profile Loader Pass
45 IPSCCP Pass
46 Lint Pass
47 Argument Promotion Pass
48 Atomic Expand Load Linked Pass
49 Constant Hoisting Pass
50 Global Optimizer Pass
51 Scalarizer Pass
52 Add Discriminators Pass
53 Separate Const. Offset From GEP Pass
54 Lower Aggr. Copies Pass
55 Allocation Hoisting
56 Global Base Register Pass
57 Cleanup Local Dynamic TLS Pass
Table I: List of used transformations
